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Janet McCann
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NAMES AND IDENTITY IN GRAHAM GREENE'S NOVELS

•
GRAHAM GREENE'S LANDSCAPE IS BY NOW
familiar to most of us as a blasted heath with the blasting
still continuing in the background. His characters live,
love, betray one another and die under his motto, "For
this is Hell, nor are we out of it." 1 What compounds the
Greene hero's tragedy is that while he is aware that he is
in hell, he is also aware that there is a heaven; this
heaven is a barely perceived , undefined realm of existence
from which he is excluded because he is unable to
imagine it fully . The Greene hero, like Dr. Faustus,
lives with the tormenting awareness of his own desolation.
The Greene priests who sum u p suicides and murderers
hint at the possibility of mercy in another life, but for
this life, Greene's heroes are damned.
The blame for this damnation does not rest with the
hero alone , because a whole complex of social and
psychological factors condition the Greene hero's crucial
choices. One most significant such factor which appears
again and again in G reene's stories and novels is lack of
identity. The character s are robbed of a sense of self by a
variety of circumstances. They have unknown or deserting
fathers, they have no homes, they have no heritage, and
they have no regular occu pations; they seem to have
been gene rated spontaneou sly on Greene's barren
landscape. The Greene hero bungles through life looking
for any kind of guidepost, any continuity, and finding
nothing but false signals and wrong directions. The
suggestion may be that the true signals and right directions
do exist, but because the Greene hero has no sense of
self on which to base an accurate idea of the world, all
his moves are fal se steps.

GREENE EMPHASIZES THE IDENTITY PROBlem in his stories by the un usual ways he names his
characters, giving them n icknames, multiple names,
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initials. Not only do the Greene characters' names define
them , but the characters have strong attitudes about
their own names and those of others. To the Greene
hero, the world's unreality is reflected in his inability to
n ame it, and he cannot name it because he himself has
n o r eal name. A typical example of this problem is
found in the title story of the collection "May We Borrow
You r Husband." The story describes a sad, nameless
waif whose per sonal insecurity contributes to her husband
being seduced away from her by homosexuals. She has
on ly a nickname , "Poopy," which suggests her wilted
insignificance. When the detached middle-aged narrator
would try to help her he cannot, because he does not
k now her name. The story epitomizes the name-identity
problem in Greene : naming implies commitment and
clarity, but the Greene hero flounders in an uncommitted
and muddled world. All the old signposts are down.
Some variations on the name-identity theme are found
in analyzing the use of names in three novels, each of
which describes a Greene hero's typical journey toward
despair. These are This Gun for Hire, Brighton Rock, and
T he Com edian s. These novels were chosen virtually at
random , because Greene treats the same issues in all his
novels, and the name-identity question could as easily
have been discussed in The ConfidentialAgen~ The Ministry
of Fear, or any number of other stories. The names
change, but their function remains the same. Greene
gives his character s names which describe their mental
landscapes, and he lets their attitudes toward their names
and others' show their desperate, futile attempts to define
themse lves with reference to their worlds.
This Gun fo r H ire concerns a contract murderer's
hesitating and ineffective steps toward self-redefinition.
In this novel ther e is a parallel between hero and antihero , both named James. James Raven, the hired gun,
goes by his last name, which represents his identity. His
heritage consists of violence and hatred: a father who
was hanged , a mother who committed suicide, a brutal
boarding school. He believes that because of his heritage
t

Graham Greene, Brighton Rock (New York : Viking Press, 1968), p.

210.
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he is what he is, a bird of prey. At the novel's beginning
he commits two murders. In his flight he falls in love
with Anne Crowder, the hero's girl. This softening proves
his undoing, for having lost his negative identity, he has
no other to take its place.
Raven clearly thinks of himself as "Raven"; he seems
reluctant to divulge his first name, and no one ever calls
him by it. In fact, we know it only from a poster. He
evades Anne's question about it.
"I don't take any stock in homes," Raven said.
"I've been in one."
"Tell me about it. What's your name?"
"You know my name. You've seen it in the papers."
"I mean your Christian name."
"Christian. That's a good joke, that one. Do you
think anyone ever turns the other cheek these days?"
He tapped the barrel of the automatic resentfully
on the cinder floor. "Not a chance." 2
Raven avoids naming others as well. At first he feels no
remorse for the murders he has committed; he depersonalizes people in his thoughts, thinking of those he
has killed as "the minister" and "the secretary." When
love of Anne has softened him and made him feel guilt,
he tries to name his victim, but he does not know the
name he needs.
He said, "I'll see you again-sometime," and when
she mechanically reassured him, "Yes," he laughed
with his aching despair. "Not likely, after I've
killed . . . . " But he didn't even know the man's
name. (p. 208)
The opposite of James Raven is James Mather, who,
as a policeman and a conventionally "good" person, is
untroubled by conflict and, it would seem, sensitivity.
Mather believes in and exemplifies the internal order
Raven lacks. Mather's identity is quite clear to himself
and to others. He can easily be read by his girl, who
finds it inappropriate to give him a nickname.
He learnt, for instance, the name and address of
the local papers, the Nottwich Journal and the Nottwich
Guardian . . .. He discovered the park, a place of
dull wilted trees and palings and gravel paths for
perambulators. Any of these facts might be of use,
and they humanized the map of Nottwich so that he
could think of it in terms of people, just as he
thought of London, when he was on a job, in terms
of Charlie's and Joe's. (p. 109)
While Raven dehumanizes by avoiding names, Mather
humanizes by naming. But Mather's view of the world is
of course an oversimplification. When Anne has betrayed
Raven to his death, Mather is unable to understand the
complexities of the situation, but can see only that his
girl is safe and crime has been punished. For James
Mather it's a simple world.
2 Graham Greene, The Ministry of Fear (New York: Doubleday,
1936), p.182. Subsequent references by page number in text.
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The issue of the name appears in other areas of this
novel as well. Raven has been hired by a man who calls
himself Cholmondeley. If Raven has a "bad" name and
Mather a "good" one, Cholmondeley has none. He is a
fat effete cipher who spends most of his time eating
sweets.
Raven said, "I thought you were never coming,
Mr. Chol-mon-deley," pronouncing every syllable.
"Chumley, my dear man, Chumley," Mr. Cholmondeley corrected him.
"It doesn't matter how it's pronounced. I don't
suppose it's your own name."
"After all, I chose it," Mr. Cholmondeley said.
His ring flashed under the great inverted bowls of
light as he turned the pages of the menu. "Have a
parfait."(p. 12)
Cholmondeley has other names, and we never learn his
real one. He seems to have no identity; he is a selfcreated caricature. Appropriately, he is only a middleman.
He works for the senile steel magnate Sir Marcus, whose
origin is also obscure.
His [Sir Marcus's] name did not appear at all in
Who's Who, and an enterprising journalist who
had once tried to write his life found extraordinary
gaps in registers: it wasn't possible to follow any
rumour to its source. (p. 168)
The characters' names suggest the grade and type of
their evil. Raven is a trained bird of prey working for
the caricature Cholmondeley, and behind them all is Sir
Marcus, like Dante's slobbering devil presiding over
Hell. And also as in Dante, the evil is far more realistic
than the good. We don't quite believe in the stolid
anonymous Detective Sergeant James Mather who gets
the girl, but Raven is real.

THE NAME-IDENTITY QUESTION IS ALSO
treated in Brighton Rock, which, like This Gun for Hire,
describes a murder, then the pursuit of, and finally, the
destruction of the murderer. Few characters have their
own names in Brighton Rock, and the multiple names
and nicknames illustrate problems in self-definition.
The first part of the novel is like a morality play. A
former gang member named Hale is being hunted down
by Death-in the form of the novel's main character,
bent on revenge. The surroundings of gay, seedy Brighton
contrast sharply with the seriousness of the death-hunt.
Hale is limited in his attempt at flight because he wants
to keep his unimportant job, in which he, using the
name Kolley Kibber, hands out cards to the public for a
newspaper promotion. Like other Greene characters,
Hale is sensitive about names; in trying to shield his
own, he attempts to preserve his shadowy identity.
What's your name?"
"Fred." He said it automatically: it was the name
The Cresset

he always gave to chance acquaintances; from some
obscure motive of secrecy he shielded his own name,
Charles; from childhood he had loved secrecy, a
hiding place, the dark; but it was in the dark he
had met Kite, the Boy, Cubitt, the whole mob.3
Hale desperately pins his hope for survival on the
companionship of the sensual Ida, who, rather like
Fellowship in Everyman, deserts him. "Fred" Hale, a
man with small knowledge of himself or of the world,
dies trying to protect what little identity he has.
After Hale's death the focus shifts to the conflict between
his killer, Pinkie, and Ida, who would revenge Hale
although she did not save him. The character developed
in most detail is Pinkie. Pinkie thinks a great deal about
his identity. Like Raven, he comes from sordidness. He
was born in Nelson Place, a poor Catholic ghetto where
his witnessing of his parents' "Saturday night exercise"
left him with a lasting aversion to sex and to intimacy of
any kind . His hatred of sex and his substitution of
cruelty for intimacy are perhaps the most significant
facets of his personality. In a sense, Pinkie, too, has no
identity; he has rejected the values of Nelson Place, but
has only negative values to substitute for them. His state
of mind is suggested by the condition of Paradise Piece,
his childhood home.
Half Paradise Piece had been torn up as if by bomb
bursts: the children played about the steep slope of
rubble; a piece of fireplace showed houses had
once been there. . . . His home was gone: a flat
place among the rubble may have marked its hearth;
the room at the bend of the stairs where the Saturday
night exercise had taken place was just air. (p. 140)

Bnghton Rock is filled with nicknames, which often
suggest fragmented lives. There is Kite, Pinkie's only
father figure and the man Hale betrayed to his death.
Pinkie has patterned his life after that of the ascetic gang
leader in order to make his life style as different from
Nelson Place's as possible. But Pinkie hardly knew Kite,
and copies only his mannerisms. Besides Kite there are
Dallow, Cubitt, Spicer, and others, all vague figures
who live in the world of evil just below the carefree
surface of Brighton. This use of nicknames adds to the
allegorical tone of the novel. Around the central conflicts
(between Ida and Pinkie and between Pinkie's habitual
self and his ineffective better nature) hover the unnamed,
incomplete characters, like abstractions emptied of content.
The story is a negative morality play: it describes the
journey of the Boy, Hell already in his mind, toward his
final damnation, assisted by Vices. It is the Boy's drunken
lawyer who quotes, "For this is Hell, nor are we out of
it."
There are a few characters in the novel who have real
names. The waitress Rose, the only unequivocally good
character in the novel, has a simple name which suggests
her natural and spontaneous acceptance of life. She
makes no attempt to deny or to hide her Nelson Place
heritage. Other named characters include Ida Arnold
and her friend Phil Corkery. These people believe in
themselves and in Right and Wrong; they never glance
below the surface of things. In Greene's world they are
neither good nor evil, but merely ignorant. For such
people-as for James Mather-there are no ambiguities.
In Greene's novels, then, to have a real name means to
have a sense of self, but it may be a false sense of self.

There is no real name given for Pinkie; he is usually
called "the Boy," an epithet even more impersonal than
his nickname. Of course Pinkie is no "boy" as the word
is usually understood, for he is a calculating killer at
seventeen. Yet his very existence suggests perhaps that
the innocence of childhood is illusory. In one way,
however, Pinkie really is a "boy," for he looks at the
world without understanding it, with all the rage and
hatred of the betrayed child.
Most of Brighton Rock is, then, about the second
manhunt; Ida, the embodiment of Law and Order,
Right and Wrong, chases down the Boy. The pursuit is
complicated by Pinkie's struggle to remain evil. Like
Raven, Pinkie is softened by attraction to a woman. To
save his skin he must marry a witness, Rose, a waitress
also from Nelson Place who is as good as he is evil.
Occasionally, he feels stirrings of pity for her. But his
evil is too strong and too habitual to be overcome. The
suggestion seems to be that if he could accept through
Rose his real identity, his Nelson Place heritage, then
he could be saved. But he does not; he is still "the Boy"
at his death.

IN THE COMEDIANS, THE NAME-IDENTITY
question is made more explicit and is in fact one of the
main foci of the novel. The three main characters are
named Brown, Smith, and Jones, phony-sounding names
for three men who turn out to be not quite real. The
main character, Brown, is struck by the irony of the
name situation. When he first notices the coincidence,
he says, "Smith, Jones, and Brown,-the situation was
improbable. I had a half-right to my name, but had
he?"4 Later on, he comments, "Again I was aware of the
three names, interchangeable like comic masks in a
farce." (p. 17) The three characters' experiences in the
Haiti of Papa Doc show their various ways of being not
real.
Brown's preoccupation with his own name is associated
with his sense of not belonging anywhere. Like Raven
and Pinkie, he has no acceptable heritage to mold himself
by. His capricious mother never took much interest in
him, and left him to be educated by priests. His father
he knows nothing about: "The man she had chosen for
my father left Monte Carlo before my birth. Perhaps his

Brighton Rock, p. 13. Subsequent references by page number in
text .

p . 5.
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Graham Greene, The Comedians (New York: Viking Press, 1966),
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name was Brown. There is a ring of truth in the name
Brown-she wasn't usually so modest in her choice." (p.
52) Besides not knowing whether his name is really his,
Brown has no homeland. "I was bom in Monaco. . . .
That is almost the same as being a citizen of nowhere."
(p. 223) In his youth, he had a chance to choose a solid
identity for himself by becoming a priest. But he did not
enter the priesthood; he left to wander through the
world without any sense of self. He has another opportunity for an identity of sorts: as a hotel owner he
could affirm his vague identity as a transient by
ministering to transients, providing them a pleasuredome. But even this is denied him by Papa Doc's regime.
He is truly "a citizen of nowhere," wandering through
the world playing temporarily whatever roles he falls
into.
The name Brown has another suggestion: Brown lives
in a brown world. In all the roles he plays, in all the
events with which chance involves him, he sees the
world cynically. Because he does not believe in himself,
he has no belief in others. He invariably suspects the
worst possible motivation for any action. His mistress
says to him,
"My dear, try to believe we exist when you aren't
there. We're independent of you. None of us is like
you fancy we are. Perhaps it wouldn't matter much
if your thoughts were not so dark, always so
dark. . . . It's a dark Brown world you live in. I'm
sorry for you." (p. 219)
Finally, his false suspicions of another cause him to send
a friend to his death. And not even the realization that
he has caused a death is enough to awaken Brown to
reality. He is still without a sense of self and therefore
without a viewpoint from which to judge the world
rightly. Appropriately, at the end Brown, who is unable
to commit himself to life, becomes an undertaker's assistant.
Brown sees Smith and Jones as like himself because
they too are unreal. Jones is a petty crook with grandiose
romantic ideas and a limited understanding of the world.
Jones also has a low self-image. Unlike Brown, Jones
knows that the name he goes by is not his real one, but
an alias. What Jones wants most is respectability, but he
believes that attaining it is impossible. He divides the
world into "toffs" and "tarts." Describing the distinction
to Brown, he says,
"The toffs have a settled job or a good income.
They have a stake somewhere like you have in
your hotel. The tarts-well, we pick a living here
and there-in saloon-bars. We keep our ears open
and our eyes skinned."
"You live on your wits, is that it?"
"Or we die of them often enough."
"And the toffs-haven't they any wits?"
"They don't need wits. They have reason, intelligence, character." (p. 18)
6

Tarts may pretend to be toffs, but they cannot become
toffs. Jones, like Brown, lives in a world he has created.
Jones divides everything into unrealistically clear-cut
categories. He places himself among the bad, and cannot
see any possibility of change for himself. He lies about
himself and finally dies to protect his romanticized image
of himself as a war hero. All during his life, he is
tortured by the discrepancy between what he would like
to be and what he is, and he never sees that the world is
more various than his rigid categories would allow.
Although Smith's name is really Smith, he too is
unreal. His middle name Abel represents his role as the
innocent brother. Smith's sense of self is a false one; he
has created himself. Totally idealistic, Smith simply
does not see anything which would stand in the way of
his plans. His goal is to bring vegetarianism to Haiti,
thus preventing the "acidity" and resulting violence
which he believes meat-eating causes. Smith once ran
for President "on the vegetarian ticket"; now he plays
the role of the Presidential Candidate in Haiti, allowing
himself to be squired around and treated as a visiting
dignitary. He chats about vegetarianism with grotesque
barbarians, overlooking squalor and horror on every
side of him. Smith misses all the ironies. In contrast
with Brown, who treats everything as a joke, Smith
takes trivia seriously.
None of the three "comedians" succeeds in defining
himself in terms of the world. Brown translates all he
sees into bad. Smith sees only the good. Jones sees bad
and good but has false ideas about their nature. All
misperceive themselves and extemal reality. Smith, Jones,
and Brown are contrasted with other characters like Dr.
Magiot, the black doctor struggling realistically with his
country's problems. For Dr. Magiot, the world is real.

THE NAME-IDENTITY ISSUE AS IT APPEARS
in these and other Greene novels defines the insoluble
problem mentioned earlier: if a person has no sense of
self (represented in the stories by a single, "real" name),
then he can have no feeling of positive participation in .
the world. For to have the "!-thou" realtionship with
humanity, the "I" must exist. In part because of the
uncertainty and desolation of their worlds, Greene's
characters do not have this sense of self. And rather than
choose a pattem from the inadequate material offered
to them, they resign themselves to the hopelessness of
complete lack 9f identity, believing themselves caught
by fate. Dr. Faustus is in a sense damned for a failure of
the imagination. So too are Greene's heroes, who are
unable to compensate for their lack by observation and
honest discovery. Because they believe that some people
are simply bom into a wrong relationship with the
world, it becomes true for them, and they are trapped.
The characters' names and attitudes towards naming
show the variety of unreal ways of perceiving the ·self in
the world, misconceptions which lead to entrapment,
discouragement, and despair.
U
The Cresset

James A. Nuechterlein

IReview Essay I

CHRISTIANS AND POLITrCS

CHRISTIAN FAITH AND PUBLIC POLICY.
By Richard John Neuhaus. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1977.

THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEN ONE
concludes that the best thing for Christians to do
about politics is leave it alone. A small personal
example may illustrate.
Some years ago my congregation sent me as
delegate to a regional convention of one of the
major North American Lutheran church bodies.
The main controversy at the convention involved
a motion declaring the church's support of a
guaranteed annual income. That recommendation
coincided with my own inclinations, but I found
myself reading the particular motion on the floor
with increasing dismay. The difficulty began
with the preamble, an extended commentary
consisting of equal parts social gospel theology
and crackpot political economy. Support of the
motion on the basis of the preamble would entail
a view of capitalism as an utter occuption and an
indentification of the apostolic faith with a
particularly simple-minded version of social
democracy. The motion itself set the projected
guaranteed income at an impossibly high level,
supporting its position with spurious statistical
argument and inflamed moral rhetoric. All in
all-as I put it to my fellow delegates-it
appeared that the economic analysis in the
motion had been prepared by theologians and
the theological justification by economists.
Things turned out all right in the end. After
extended and heated debate and a thoroughly
confusing series of motions and countermotions,
the convention threw out the preamble, eliminated
any mention of a precise income level, and
retained a simple statement of support for the

principle itself. Yet no one could be confident it
had all been worth it. The delegates had
expended a great deal of time and psychic energy
considering a motion that, whatever its intrinsic
value, would carry no influence whatever out in
the real political world and which, in the way it
was debated and the forms in which it was cast,
could edify neither church nor world.

fames A. Nuechterlein is a regular contributor to The
Cresset.

WHAT LENDS IRONY TO THE CHURCH'S
assured manner in dealing with politics is the
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This minor instance exemplifies the feck less
and inept manner in which the church so often
deals with politics and public policy. The decline
of the Christian church, which involves at its
heart a decline of faith, is nowhere more clear
than in its involvement in political matters. The
problem is not as is so often supposed, that the
church lacks boldness in addressing social issues.
The most casual perusal of the political
statements of the National and World Councils of
Churches or of the Boards for Social Action of the
various denominations reveals that the problem
is more an excess of bold witness than any lack.
On everything from minimum wage laws to the
B-1 bomber to the equal rights amendment and
on into infinity the churches are willing to
proclaim with great confidence and specificity
just what it is that God's word requires. The
church in addressing the world does not
characteristically lack boldness; it unfortunately
does too often lack wisdom, knowledge, intellectual
and moral integrity, or even simple common
sense. Everyone knows in advance what most
mainline churches will say on most political
issues and hardly anyone pays any attention.

7

contrast with its contemporary approach to
theology . Clerics who speak with a modesty
bordering on agnosticism concerning fundamental
matters of faith suddenly acquire the most serene
certitude when explicating the gospel's ethical
imperatives for political life. Indeed one can,
without being entirely whimsical, posit for
American churches a law of the inverse ratio
between theological and political assurance. We
are forever being told by modern theologians
what the Biblical faith specifies for political and
social arrangements, but the substance of the faith
itself seems to become ever more problematic.
Orthodox faith withers as political engagement
blooms. (All this applies in reverse -roughly
speaking at least-to the nation's evangelicals;
they , however, while increasingly significant in
numbers, have but minimal influence in the
intellectual leadership of American Christianity.
One finds few evangelicals at prestigious seminaries
or as generally recognized spokesmen for American
religion.)

Despite the maladroit and faithless way in
which the church frequently confronts political
issues , most Christians would be unhappy with a
solution that solved the problem by ignoring it or
by willing it into oblivion. Politics is important to
our lives, which means that it cannot be
insignificant to our Christian life. We must, if we
are to take our faith serious! y, apply it in a
serious way to the things that make a difference to
us, and politics, whether we want it to or not, does
make a difference . Yet, when in the practice the
church seems so regularly to bungle the job of
relating faith to political life, either by elevating
secular political preferences into mandates of the
gospel or by reducing the gospel's transcendent
perspectives to political pieties, the temptation to
separate religion entirely from politics becomes
most beguiling.
It is in the face of this dilemma that Richard
John Neuhaus's new book Christian Faith and
Public Policy, comes as such a distinct, if · not
wholly unqualified, blessing. This is, in brief, a
very good book (good enough to make one wish it
were even better) and a most useful one as well.
Its usefulness consists not only in its seriousness
of perspective and debate but also in a coherent
and continuous structure. of argument which
proceeds systematically from theological assumptions to ethical principles to political positions.
Too often theological works on politics argue
either at a level of abstraction so rarified as to
remove them from political reality or in a mode
of discourse scarcely distinguishable from secular
assumptions and preoccupations. Neuhaus keeps
8

his theological and political perspectives tied
together and treats both with depth and
sophistication. If he does not entirely succeed in
deriving his politics from his theology, his
attempt is nonetheless valuable and instructive.

NEUHAUS'S APPROACH TO POLITICS
appears to arise directly from the circumstances of
his personal situation. He is a Lutheran parish
pastor with a deep commitment to the catholic
tradition of the Christian faith . He is also a
deeply engaged social critic and political activist.
In these non-complementary circumstances lie
the problem: Christian orthodoxy in general and
Lutheranism in particular have frequently been
identified with political quietism , while serious
social and political thought in modern America
remains overwhelmingly secular. Neuhaus insists
on remaining in both his worlds and refuses to
sacrifice one to the other. This is the dynamic
behind his major role in the Hartford Appeal of a
few years back, in which he and like-minded
religious intellectuals, whiie reaffirming their
commitment to significant social change,
emphasized the transcendent nature of religion
and warned against the conflation of religious
truth with purely humanist perspectives. Faith is
related to social action, the Hartford signers
argued, but is not coextensive with it and must
retain its distinctive- and finally ultimateintegrity.
Neuhaus wants a politics rooted finally in
Christian conviction, one that, because of that
conviction, is urgent in its liopes and practice but
is at the same time free from the fanatical or
apocalyptic temptations that can so easily afflict
Christian political engagement. He is careful to
avoid absolute claims for his own convictions and
insights. In working on this study, he informs us ,
he was "newly impressed by the elements of risk ,
fallibility, contingency, and awareness of ignorance
that must mark thoughtful engagement in public
affairs." Too often, he goes on, "what passes for
prophetic pronouncement is merely the posturing
of unwarranted certitude ." Morever, the church
in its worship life looks ultimately to a reality
that transcends any of this world's political
arrangements; its sacramental celebrations "are
exercises in the politics of the ultimate to which
all other politics are penultimate."
At the same time, however, Neuhaus insists on
the urgent, even redemptive, nature of political
life and suggests that whatever the dangers of
Christians confusing their personal political
preferences with the requirements of the gospel,
"the greater and more common sin . . . is to be
paralyzed by uncertainty. " In the same vein, he
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argues that "although there is a danger of
manipulating sacred symbols for partisan purposes,
the much more common temptation is the
evasion of the controversial or the use of sacred
symbols to reinforce the legitimacy of the status
quo." What the church must always remember,
Neuhaus concludes, is that God is active in the
world and that the political arrangements of the
secular order are indeed penultimate: "the
present political task participates, by the grace
and power of God, in the ultimate re-ordering of
reality that is his work in history and that will be
consummated in the kingdom of God."
Neuhaus's theological aim, then, is to find a
rationale for a politics at once urgent and
provisional, free alike from Christian resignation
and Christian fanaticism. He finds it in a
traditional place: the image of two kingdoms of
God. The two kingdoms model-expressed
historically in various ways as the left and right
hands of God or as the distinctive realms of
creation and redemption, justice and love, law
and gospel-has fallen into disfavor among many
Christian ethicists because of its presumed
tendency to quietism and withdrawal. Neuhaus
presents it, however, not as a way of walling off
sacred from secular or of dividing Christian life
into separate compartments but as a metaphor for
the tension between what he terms the "nowness"
and "not yetness" of human history. Neuhaus's
thinking about sacred and secular alike is always
dialectical. He means the two kingdoms to
express not "a static formula of coexistence"
between church and world but the unresolvable
and creative tension between history and
eschatology, between what is and what is to be,
between society's demonic and redemptive
possibilities. The two kingdoms are distinguished
in principle but overlapping and interpenetrating
in practice even as, in similar metaphor, the
kingdom of God already is and is yet to come. It
is Neuhaus's hope that his eschatologically-based
formulation of the two kingdoms will suggest
"both the integral nature of politics to the hope
for salvation and, at the same time, the modestly
'proleptic' nature of political action at this
provisional moment in our relationship of the
oncoming kingdom of God."

HAVING BRIEFLY SKETCHED HIS THEOlogical presuppositions (readers interested in a
fuller-and more radical-statement of Neuhaus's
fundamental assumptions should consult his
earlier Time Toward Home [New York: Seabury,
1975]), Neuhaus goes on to describe nine ways in
which the church can help relate faith to public
policy: prayer and proclamation, cultivation of
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civil virtue and piety, the internal politics of the
Christian community, individual Christian
vocations, research and education, advocacy by
groups and individuals, corporate statements,
official leadership, and political implementation.
From there he proceeds to an outline of 57
general ethical principles or "testings for
decision" in political action; and then, finally, he
presents a wide-ranging and inclusive, if
necessarily compressed, survey of the major
issues of contemporary public policy. In assessing
his conclusions, it is perhaps useful to reverse
Neuhaus's own procedure and move backwards
from his politics to his theology.
It is not possible, even in capsule form, to
summarize Neuhaus's positions on the major
political issues of the age . He attempts to impose
some degree of thematic unity by positing three
basic presuppositions for testing policy: enthusiasm
for pluralism, commitment to a fully-democratic
process of decision-making, and examination of
issues particularly in terms of their impact "upon
the poor, the marginal, and the outcast." (The
wording of the last point is of the sort that usually
warns us of impending bathos; in this case, this is
fortunately not so.) Neuhaus's general stance
might best be described as post-liberal-a modish
term, but difficult to avoid in this instance. More
often that not, his political views fall on the left
side of the spectrum (though they do so less
consistently than expected or than one suspects
would have been the case a few years ago), but he
very seldom dispenses conventional liberal
wisdom and is frequently skeptical of the
standard secular pieties. In fact-and this is most
surprising for one who not long ago was seriously
considering the need for a revolution in
America-Neuhaus at times sounds suspiciously
like a neo-conservative. He appears to be one of
those radicals, or former radicals, who finds it
easier to get along with conservatives than with
liberals.
At any rate, his comments on specific issues,
whether one agrees with them or not, are
normally intelligent, perceptive, and sensitive to
complexity and ambiguity. One experiences
difficulty with Neuhaus less over his particular
political positions than with his efforts to connect
those policy preferences to his theological
assumptions.
Neuhaus argues reasonably that it is unnecessary
that Christians find "an explicit theological or

9

scriptural warrant" for every political position
they take. He recognizes the role of reason and of
simple prudence in political life, and he
acknowledges as well that most political issues
involve enough moral ambiguity that Christians
of equal moral passion and insight may
legitimately come to differing conclusions
concerning them. These concessions, however,
come into at least partial conflict with Neuhaus's
concern that Christians, collectively as well as
individually, should regularly involve themselves
in political life as Christians and should do so,
moreover, from an explicitly theological
perspective: "Protest or advocacy that is offered
in the name of the church or of the Christian faith
must be clearly related to the Word of God, both
law and gospel, by which the community of faith
lives and offers itself in service to the world."
The difficulties which anse from these
contrasting emphases take varying forms. On not
infrequent occasions, Neuhaus's policy positions
cannot sustain the churchly warrant suggested
for them. Take, for example, his views on
migrant agricultural labor.
The churches should strongly support the
extension of labor protections to agricultural
workers. This includes the necessary right to
operate "closed union shops," although we need
to recognize some of the individual injustices
this may create.

Whatever one's views on the issue itself, it is
difficult in the extreme to find a theological or
m~ral imperative that would require arguing
that "the churches should" support closed union
shops for farm workers or anybody else. Surely
this is an occasion for prudential judgment and
not one that should be confused or muddied by
assigning moral necessity to one side or the
other.
There are other areas in which Neuhaus's
moral imperatives, while less capricious and
more plausible, remain open to serious question
or at least require greater elaboration. He argues
that the churches must "persistently, boldly and
uncompromisingly" oppose the "morally intolerable" assumptions of mutual assured destruction
on whi~h current strategic planning rests.
Instinctively, we rush to agree: the balance of
terror that currenty guards the peace between
the US and the USSR is indeed morally absurd,
even monstrous. Yet that does not necessarily
make it "morally intolerable," not, at least, if one
believes that Christians must actively involve
themselves even in those terrible areas of
political life in which there exist among
available alternatives no good choices. In such
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circumstances, that which is unavoidable cannot
be morally intolerable, and there is a good case
to be made that in the current or reasonably
foreseeable state of Soviet-American relations no
plausible alternative exists to the balance of
terror. (Detente does not change this; it in fact
depends in considerable part directly upon it.)
History cannot be undone or reconstituted
simply by act of will. Neuhaus wants the
churches to challenge "the climate of fear or
complacency" that in his view prevents the
consideration of strategic alternatives, but that
appraisal suggests a backwards view of things.
Our nuclear dilemma arises out of the history of
international relations-and of technological
changes-since 1917. It is not simply an
irrational creation of moral idiots; nor is it
subject to resolution simply through moral
urgency. One cannot, as Neuhaus wants to, reject
pacifism, accept the reality of the US as a
responsible world power, acknowledge the
legitimacy of pursuit of the national interest-and
then insist on a stance of absolute moral rejection
of a policy that in existing circumstances flows
naturally from those stipulations. Neuhaus
suggests as his alternative steps in the direction
of unilateral disarmament, but it is difficult to
believe that anyone with a realistic view of Soviet
intentions or assumptions could prescribe any
such moral duty to those charged with protection
of America's security and survival.
Here as elsewhere, Neuhaus appears to want
things both ways. He admits that we face
"excruciating dilemmas" for which there are no
easy solutions; yet he wants at the same time to
assume a stance of moral boldness and clarity.
His analyses admit over and over that things are
not simple, but his prescriptions don't always
reflect that knowledge.
On some rare occasions, on the other hand,
Neuhaus strangely holds back from making the
clear moral claims that certain issues call for and
that seem, moreover, to follow from his own
analysis. Thus he shows in an excellent brief
discussion that Christians must look on abortion
with great moral repugnance and that no
competing "rights" can override the right to life,
and yet his policy recommendations waffle
around among suggestions that "some Christians
believe" in one solution while "other Christians
strongly support" other positions and that "yet
others would favor" a third approach. After
appearing finally to take a firm stand ("public
policy on abortion should have a clear and
emphatic bias toward preserving the life of the
unborn") he abruptly and lamely retreats: "How
such a policy might be established, or even if it is
possible, is the subject of continuing debate."
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Neuhaus's reticence here is both uncharacteristic
and unnecessary.
THE UNDERLYING ISSUE IN ALL THESE
cases is the problematic one of relating policy
positions to theological and moral assumptions.
So often-and instances large and small could
easily be multiplied-Neuhaus's choices appear
simply random or idiosyncratic. The problem is
not that Neuhaus is a particularly arbitrary or
incoherent thinker, for he is neither. The
problem emerges rather from the exercise itself.
Neuhaus understands this: he concedes that
while his policy preferences follow plausibly
from his theological and moral assumptions,
they do not do so necessarily. Here is the heart of
the matter. For if Christians of comparable
knowledge and moral sense can legitimately
come to opposing conclusions on most issues,
what does it mean to speak of Christian positions
on those issues? And if Christians cannot with
reasonable confidence say "thus saith the Lord"
on most policy matters, why then assume that the
churches should frequently and boldly speak out
on them?
There is a distinction to be made between the
necessity for choice and the necessity for
Christian choice. We are required to make many
decisions, even many important ones, where the
word of God offers no clear advice. It is one
thing to argue that no significant area of life falls
outside Christian concern, but quite another to
suppose that Christian faith and piety offer clear
guides for all significant choices. It is worth
recalling the ancient wisdom that political
philosophy consists of finding reasons for doing
things we want to do instinctively, and it
damages the social bond to inflame politics by
confusing our instincts with God's requirements.
Invoking transcendent and absolute claims
where there is no clear requirement or
justification for them renders impossible the
civility and tolerance necessary to reasoned
democratic discourse.
Neuhaus understands all this and makes
rhetorical concessions to much of it. Yet his
dialectical tensions regularly find an activist
resolution. He finds less danger in Christians
speaking from their faith when they should not
than in refraining from doing so when they
should. For Christians to be "paralyzed with
uncertainty" is, in his view, a failure of courage
and of faith: "it is the refusal to live and act, also
in the political realm, in radical dependence
upon God's forgiving and correcting love." But
the significant question is not whether Christians
should act, but whether they should act with the
explicit or implicit assumption of Christian
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sanction for their acts. God's "forgiving and
correcting love" applies to our sins, not to our
honest failures of knowledge and understanding
or our lack of wisdom. Most political mistakes
involve error, not sin; the answer to inadequate
politics is not forgiveness and grace but better
political judgment.
A SIMILAR LINE OF ARGUMENT APPLIES
to Neuhaus's comments on uncertainty and
courage. He subtitles his book, "thinking and
acting in the courage of uncertainty." But again
the point is not whether we act, but the basis
upon which we do so. One can argue against
Neuhaus that claiming to discern the will of God
in an ambiguous situation involves not courage
but lack of humility. We have to act, and we have
to seek God's will for our actions, but our
ignorance is such and the ambiguity and
complexity of the moral life are such that we
very often must act without being able confidently
to invoke God's will in our defense . That being
the case, in most discrete political situations
Christians will act essentially out of the same
calculations of prudence and reason as do
secularists (however different their ultimate
motives and rationale may be). Neuhaus grants
that our understanding of God's word is fallible
and uncertain, and that most political decisions
are exerc"ises in prudential choice; yet at the
same time he wants the Christian churches to act
regularly in political affairs and to do so directly
out of their faith and piety. There are times when
his dialectical tensions look suspiciously like
contradictions: the warnings of caution and
contingency lack meaning up against all those
specific injunctions as to what the churches
"should" do on given issues.
There are excellent practical reasons for
suggesting that the churches could do with less
assurance in applying God's will to specific
political cases. In the first place, by earnestly
proclaiming God's preferences on an astonishingly
inclusive range of issues, the churches overload
and finally trivialize political piety. It seems
obvious that the political impact of the churches
would be greater if they limited themselves to
those issues of major importance where the moral
imperatives are relatively clear. By claiming to
discern the will of God for every issue under the
sun the churches simply appear morally arrogant
and politically foolish.
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There is also the matter of Ideological
partisanship, which Neuhaus notes but does not
sufficiently emphasize. The simple, documentable
fact is that too many national and international
church bodies regularly apply the word of God to
political issues in a manner that is partial,
selective, and often crudely tendentious. The
casual and arbitrary way in which the churches
attach God's name to the prevailing preferences
of the political Left or Right approaches
blasphemy. (For the mainline churches, the
identification is overwhelmingly with the Left;
the fundamentalist and Bible churches, though
they tend to be essentially apolitical, usually lean
Right when addressing political matters.) One
major reason for the leadership-laity gap on
socio-political issues in so many churches today is
the laity's anger and frustration over being fed a
diet of partisan political biases which they are
told they must swallow in the name of the Lord.
Thus when the church does have truly prophetic
words to utter at certain critical moments, those
genuine morsels of bread lie lifeless and
unheeded among all the stones that have
preceded them. If the church wants to be heard in
the world, or even by its own members, it will
have to stop debasing its own moral coin through
triviality and tendentiousness.
Neuhaus's political preferences follow no party
line and he has himself spoken out against
selective moral indignation and ideological
manipulation of Christian social concern. He
remains, nonetheless, committed on theological
grounds to a more intimate and direct relationship
between religious faith and public policy than is
normal for those operating out of two kingdoms
assumptions. The key here, as noted previously,
is the eschatological basis of his version of the two
kingdoms. His basic categories of "now" and "not
yet" exist in tension, but their interconnection is
more significant for Neuhaus's politics than is
their distinctiveness. As he concedes, his
formulation "assumes a more unified notion of
history and the salvation promised to history"
than does the classic two kingdoms traditon
rooted in St. Augustine. (A far more explicit
statement of the unity of history and eschatology
may be found in Time Toward Home.)

IN THE PARTIAL MERGING OF HISTORY
and eschatology, Neuhaus creates a basis for
speaking of "the integral nature of politics to the
hope for salvation." In Time Toward Home he
goes so far as to argue that "all of history is
redemptive history or none of history is
redeemed," though he appears somewhat to draw
back from that extreme position in the present
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study. The eschatological note in Christian Faith
and Public Policy is always qualified by warnings
of provisionality, but it remains essential to
providing the tone of urgency in Neuhaus's
political analysis. Thus he argues that while the
Christian focuses ultimately on the promised
kingdom of the future (prefigured in the Risen
Christ and experienced and celebrated now in
the holy Eucharist), that future focus infuses our
understanding of the present and therefore "in
no way detracts from the urgency" of our
political tasks. For Neuhaus, political life in the
order of creation does not lack for redemptive
activity or significance.
The eschatological theme appears relatively
unobjectionable until one attempts to apply it
seriously. Then it seems to say either too much or
too little. The problem is that post-apostolic
history reveals no discernible pattern of
eschatological meaning. (At one point in Time
Toward Home Neuhaus speaks of "the unfolding
revelation of history's purpose ," but it seems
certain he would disavow the doctrine of moral
progress implicit in any full elaboration of that
phrase.) Since this is so and since we have in any
case only the vaguest idea of what the End Time
might consist in, it seems not finally to mean very
much to base political urgency in eschatological
hopes . If we could discern the End Time in any
way that has substantive political meaning, it
would not make sense for us to do so
provisionally or tentatively; if we can not, we do
better to leave it largely to the realm of Christian
mystery and hope and to find purpose for our
politics elsewhere. A political slogan of a few
years back warned against "immanentizing the
Eschaton." That warning still holds , and if the
Eschaton is neither immanent nor (so far as we
know) imminent, then one wonders what it can
add to political discourse beyond a certain
rhetorical flourish .
In one way , this may state the case too strongly.
It might well be argued that however vague our
knowledge of final things, we do know in at least
general outline the goods for which men
universally strive and which might, in shorthand
terms, be described as their eschatological hopes:
peace, freedom, love, abundance, etc. But, as
Neuhaus concedes, even if we can agree on our
political ends we have no easy way of relating
those ends to specific means. We know racial
discrimination is morally wrong; we don't
necessarily know that school busing or employment
quotas are thereby required. The means-ends
confusion in fact creates some of our most
arrogant and destructive forms of political
activity, particularly the assumption of so many
that because their program posits as its purpose
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the achievement of peace and freedom those who
oppose that program are not just wrong-headed
but immoral. (There is also a theological problem
here. For the Christian the things of the End
Time are of God's choosing and God's doing. It is
dangerous to relate our political ends and means,
in however modified or qualified a manner, to
God's ultimate purposes. In Christian orthodoxy,
salvation is a suprahistorical and suprapolitical
event.)
In most cases, the direct political lessons that
the Christian draws from his faith are negative
ones. He learns from God's law the things that
men and nations must not do, which is to say he
learns the limits of permissible political activity.
Christians will be able more confidently to
describe injustice than to prescribe justice; they
can discern history's demonic elements far more
readily than its redemptive ones. The emphasis
on the negative arises not from any misanthropic
bias, but from the Christian's steady view of man's
fallen condition and of the frailties and
fallibilities that issue from that condition. A very
large amount of the sentimentality in our politics
would evaporate instantly if the implications of
original sin for public policy were understood.
Luther's simple insight should be reiterated
regularly to all those who play a major role in
forming and guiding our political life: it is not
necessary nor even possible to run the state by the
gospel. The Christian magistrate does not forgive
the duly convicted man before him seventy times
seven: he throws him in the slammer. (And if
extenuating circumstances lead him not to do so,
he acts "compassionately" not out of the gospel
but in the application of fair justice.) Not all
political acivity is negative, of course. Opportunities
exist for improving social arrangements in
various ways-and these call for full use of our
energies and talents- but always the knowledge
of human nature will guide Christians away from
utopian illusions and back to the understanding
of the proximate and limited nature of man's
striving for the good.
It should not be inferred that Neuhaus rejects
these traditional Lutheran insights. Indeed,
while he might formulate them differently, he
affirms many, even most, of them. Yet he wants at
the same time to find theological sanction for a
more programmatic model of Christian political
activity than is normally derived from two
kingdoms thinking. The argument here should
not be confused. The point is not that Christians
should not be activist or should not have
ideological preferences; it is rather that in the
great majority of cases it is not possible to find
clear moral/theological sanction for particular
actions or particular preferences. Even activism
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itself is not mandated by Christian faith, though
it is currently most unfashionable to make that
point. A variety of styles of political piety may
legitimately be inferred from the New Testament
witness, and one of those legitimate styles is
Christian resignation. If all Christians adopted
that style, of course, the results would be
disastrous, but so also would it be disastrous if all
Christians became political activists. There are
few political visions more chilling than that of a
totally politicized community. One cannot
disagree with Neuhaus's argument for the
urgency of political life, but politics is urgent for
the Christian in the same way as all of life is
urgent. It has no peculiar urgency of its own.
Where Neuhaus goes wrong, in the above view,
is in adopting a version of two kingdoms thinking
that goes contrary to some of its basic intentions.
The purpose of two kingdoms thought is to
distinguish between our political ends, which are
proximate, and our hopes for salvation, which
are ultimate. Neuhaus accepts this distinction in
theory, but then so fuses history and eschatology
as to insist on "the integral nature of politics to
the hope for salvation." It is difficult, within two
kingdoms assumptions, to know just what that
statement might mean, even as it is difficult to
understand how "the present political task
participates . . . in the ultimate re-ordering of
reality that is [God's] work in history." One is
further puzzled by Neuhaus's argument that the
Christian's focus on the ultimate reign of God
detracts "in no way" from the urgency of the here
and now. If one accepts as the Christian's final
destiny the transcendent kingdom of God , then
that would seem to relativize everything short of
that kingdom of grace.
NEUHAUS IS LUTHERA~ ENOUGH TO
find two kingdoms thought necessary to responsible
Christian political life ; he is at the same time
politically engaged enough to resist its
conservatizing implications. But those implications
are there. It is not the case, of course, that
Lutherans must be conservatives, but wherever
we position ourselves on the ideological spectrum,
two kingdoms assumptions will make us more
philosophically conservative than we otherwise
would be. Neuhaus himself provides an excellent
illustration of this principle. As already indicated,
Time Toward Home is theologically and politically
more radical than Christian Faith and Public Policy;
it is no accident (as the Marxists used to say) that
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the earlier book explicitly rejects two kingdoms
thought while the later one explicitly affirms its.
The same conservatlzmg dynamic can be
observed in the spirit of the Hartford Appeal ,
which, as its radical critics correctly suggested
(over Neuhaus's objections), had moderating
political implications.
The struggle over the two kingdoms holds
major significance for the definition of the
church's ministry. We hear constantly these days
that the church must minister to the "whole
man." On its face, that view is unobjectionable-we
must address all of our neighbor's needs- but in
practice the slogan can serve to deny the
intention of two kingdoms doctrine. Man is
whole; he is not undifferentiated . The argument
that it is meaningless or even pernicious to
distinguish between men 's physical and spiritual
natures is empirically dubious and theologically
dangerous. The church's divinely-inspired and
peculiar mandate is to proclaim the gospel, and it
is not somehow all one process to offer a man
bread and to forgive his sins. The failure to
distinguish those actions makes neither political
nor theological sense. It is terribly important that
men's material needs be met, and so the church
includes that in its ministry ; but it is the
forgiveness of sins alone that is of ultimate
importance. This is why the church, even in its
moments of deepest political involvement, will
always be other-minded. Christian theology is
not based in materialist assumptions; we know
the root of man's alienation and we know as well
that that alienation exists independently of his
material situation. This perspective in no way
negates or minimizes the church's social ministry,
but it does place it in a distinctive context.
How then should Christians act in political
life? Variously , for one thing. One of Neuhaus's
most attractive emphases is his encouragement of
political pluralism within the church as well as in
the wider society. (Although , as already indicated,
his frequent specification of what the churches
"should" do on given issues seems to conflict with
the pluralist argument.) There is no theological
necessity for Christians to agree on political
issues or even on general ideological orientation.
God's word does not tell us whether to be
conservatives, liberals, or radicals. It tells us that
we must care tor our neighbors and work for the
general welfare , but it does not in most cases
prescribe the manner of our caring or define
precisely the nature of the common good.
IF POLITICAL PLURALISM IS A VIRTUEor at least an inevitability-among individual
Christians, that has significant implications for
the church as a collectivity. Here Neuhaus fails
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us to some· extent: one wishes he had given closer
attention to differences between individual and
collective realms. The ethical and practical
problems vary considerably between the two and
so their respective political imperatives are not
always consonant. The Christian as responsible
citizen must make political choices in situations
where the church may properly remain neutral
or silent.
The distinction is important. Neuhaus is
correct in arguing that "loving service is
inseparable from the church's authentic existence,"
but that does not mean that political activity is
the most obvious or best form for that service to
take. The individual Christian remains politically
responsible whether or not the issue before him
affords a clear moral/theological choice; the
church does not. In fact, it can be argued that
where it is not clear that the church should speak,
it is clear that the church should not speak. As
Neuhaus notes, advocacy offered in the name of
the church should be grounded in the church's
faith. The church is not just another pressure or
interest group. It presumes to speak in the name
of the Lord, and that, as Neuhaus puts it, "is an
awesome responsibility," one that must be
exercised with the greatest care. If the church
speaks out on public issues on other than
compelling moral/theological grounds, it confuses
its mission and purpose and divides the body of
Christ unnecessarily. If it trivializes or politicizes
God 's word , it speaks its Lord's name in vain .
This is not a prescription for political quietism,
not, at least, if that term is meant to deny the
relevance of God's word for the political order.
The argument that the church ought to apply
God's word to politics more discriminatingly and
carefully than it currently does is not a call to the
church to ignore politics or to live its life in some
"sacred" sanctuary removed from the real and
"secular" world outside its gates. The occasions
for the necessary corporate political witness of
the church may be less frequent than activist
clerics suppose, but they do arise. There is
nothing in the legitimate uses of two kingdoms
thought to justify or mitigate the failure of the
churches to speak out against Nazi philosophy or
practice, even as there is nothing in that thought
to excuse racial discrimination or misuse of
power or oppression of the weak. There are
conflict situations in which the moral weight lies
clearly on one side, and in those situations the
church must speak firmly and without hesitation.
Aside from those moments of necessary moral
speaking and acting, the church will most
usefully involve itself in politics by assisting
individual Christians and smaller groups within
the church in their political vocations. What the
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church has to offer is not specialized knowledge
or lessons in political substance and strategy;
those things are in general better obtained
elsewhere. The church does, however, have a
special duty to alert Christians to the
moral/theological implications of political
behavior, a duty which is now, in the man,
performed eagerly but very badly.
Rather than issuing grand moral pronouncements that normally reflect more fervor than
competence, the church would better use its
energies in instructing its members in the very
exacting and complex art of applying moral
judgment to political action . It would be useful,
for example, for the churches to distribute for
individual, group, and congregational use
balanced analytical essays or firmly argued
debates by knowledgeable people on the moral
implications of specific issues. This would
encourage individual Christians to accept the
responsibility for making their own moral
choices. It would also help remind everyone that
most political issues are morally arguable, and
that political morality is more often ambiguous
and uncertain than clear and precise .
It is currently the great failure of the churches
in the political realm that they so often confuse
moral earnestness with moral seriousness. In
every other area of knowledge, we concede that
the more we learn about a given subject, the more
we come to see its complexity. Yet in morality,
particularly political morality , we so often talk as
if the reverse were true. We confuse moral
rhetoric and gesture with moral substance, and
we accept as our premier moralists our most
terrible simplifiers. Surely it is obvious by now
that not everything said in the name of love is
loving or lovely and not everything proclaimed
as liberation in fact liberates. By the same token,
the meaning of "social justice" is not self-evident
and people of comparable good will and
understanding can have very different conceptions
of what it consists of and how it might be
achieved.
ONE OF THE UNFORTUNATE LEGACIES
of the civil rights and antiwar movements is the
notion that most political issues are morally
simple, and that moral exhortation is therefore
the most important ingredient of purposeful
political activity. But neither the premise nor the
conclusion is true. Even when we can be
reasonably assured as to the morally-preferable
goal in a given situation, we will find ourselves,
in most cases, legitimately disagreeing as to how
that goal might be reached . Much of political life
is ironic: we accomplish other than what we
intend, and our unanticipated consequences
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often run counter to our original purposes. It is
not easy to combine recognition of moral
ambiguity with the need for positive political
action, but the frustrations of responsible moral
behavior exist in the nature of things; they
cannot be avoided or transcended.
Moral humility is a useful lesson, not in order
that moral obligations might be evaded but that
we might explicitly recognize the limits of our
moral knowledge and behavior. It is the burden
of moral life-even more in politics than
elsewhere-that we are required to choose even
though our ignorance and frailty make correct
choice problematic. It does nothing to ease that
burden to make the choices appear simpler than
they are. In the existing situation, moral
arguments tend more frequently to cloud issues
than to illuminate them. The problem is not that
moral arguments do not belong in politics, but
that the relationship of morality to politics is
infinitely more complex than we would like it to
be. The churches should help us recognize that
dilemma, not attempt to preach or pray it out of
existence.
This means the church should not say more
than it knows, however great the temptation .
When it is unsure, it should admit it. Nor need it,
where appropriate, fear keeping silent. It should
never bind consciences prematurely or unnecessarily. On issues where the moral balance is
unclear-which is most often the case-reason
and prudence may be allowed to prevail:
Christians need not undervalue the uses of
secularity. It is precisely the importance of moral
issues in politics that requires that they be treated
with high seriousness and not applied lightly or
inappropriately. All of which means that the
church in addressing politics needs more toughmindedness-not in the way it acts but in the way
it thinks.
In working its way through the thicket of
political morality, the church needs all the help it
can get, which is why Neuhaus's book is so
welcome. Its combination of theological depth
and political insight is all too rare, and while
individual readers will quarrel with certain of its
conclusions, they will recognize that it deals in a
sophisticated manner with the necessary questions.
Lutheran political activists are in relatively short
supply, and when they, like Neuhaus, have
learned to reflect seriously on what they do, the
church should cherish them, even when it does
not fully agree with them.
tJ
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"IT IS FINISHED"

NORMAN NAGEL

St. John 19:30

HAVE YOU THOUGHT OF THE THINGS
that aren't getting done because you've come to
worship? We spend our days trying to get things done,
worthwhile things, and some not so worthwhile, but
they never seem to stay put. Things come unstuck-even
the big things: what you are investing your life in, the
home you are making, the bringing up of your children,
the part you play in church, and in the town and
society. We want to be able to say, "I've done it," but
uncertainties and our falling short make that
impossible. Why keep on trying? Why not give up?
Because we know ourselves and our lives to be
involved in what happened on Calvary. That is why we
are here, and now we come to that triumphant word of
work completed, of job done, "It is finished."
Last night's Gospel began
Now before the feast of the Passover, when Jesus knew
that his hour had come to depart out of this world to
the Father, having loved his own who were in the
world, he loved them to the end.

Norman Nagel is Dean of the Chapel of the Resurrection,
Valparaiso University, and Preacher to the University.
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"He loved them to the end." It is the same word: to the
end, to completion, to doing what was his to do for
The Cresset

those he loved, for you and for me. Now we hear him
cry It's done. It is finished.
Let us consider how we contradict this word of Jesus,
and then how we live in the sure fact of it.
What messes us up, what puts us wrong with God is
our sin, our turning away from him, our taking over
the job of being God, a job we can surely never
complete . To break with God is to break with him from
whom comes our life. "The wages of sin is death." We
have heard Jesus cry out as he suffered that death for
sin , that separation from God, the hell that was ours to
suffer he suffered for us all the way to the end. He
cried, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"
Jesus spoke these words beginning Psalm 22, and at its
end we are told of the Lord and his deliverance that he
has wrought. He has done it.
"No, he hasn't," is what you say whenever you cling
to your sin, won't let it go, insist that you bear it, take
its punishment. Are you one who hears this word of
Jesus, one who has often heard, "Your sins are forgiven
you for Jesus' sake," and yet you cling to your sin , let it
hold you, warp you, embitter you, overshadow your
life, make yourself suffer for it and show how you are
suffering for it by keeping on being miserable about it,
and insisting how worthless you are? This can even be
done most awfully piously and religiously , yet it is flat
contradiction of him, his cross, and his cry, "It is
finished." He has taken your sins and answered for
them. If you insist on having them, on suffering for
them, then you have to take them back from him, away
from Calvary back upon yourself. If you insist, you can
have them and the answering for them, and so reclaim
your hell. Leave your sins with him at Calvary , and
pray with Dr. Luther, "I am your sin. You are my
righteousness ."
April, 1978

He's done it, and you can now no more be destroyed
by your sins than he was. You are freed of them and
their dominion over you, you are forgiven, as surely as
Christ did it all for you and cried , "It is finished."
He forgives us. He accepts us. He delights in us. We
are his and his gifts and resources are all for us.
Prompted by all that he has done for us we would show
with our lives that we are his. We keep plugging along,
no longer grubbing away with our sins, in bondage to
them, or in the bondage of trying to prove that we have
got it all under control, producing our works that
prove that we are somebody, that surely gets things
done and can finish them in a way that commands the
applause of men and even of God himself. We see
people grinding their lives away under this kind of
pressure and the fear of not making it, as if Calvary
had never happened, as if Jesus had never cried, "It is
finished."
We who are gathered again at the foot of the cross
and hear our Savior cry, "It is finished, " at the end of
each day can confidently pray:
··
Dear Lord, forgive me and the whole lot of this past
day for Calvary's sake. There isn't a perfect thing in it
that doesn't need forgiveness. And in forgiving me,
please accept me and what I have striven to do this
day. Make good my shortcomings and graciously use
me and what I have done for the good of those I love,
for the good of those you love. Grant me now to sleep
in the confidence of your forgiveness and love, and
wake me tomorrow for another day invigorated and
shaped by the fact that I am yours, until you wake me
that day when you bring to completion what you have
in mind with me, that that too may be finished to your
undying praise. Amen.
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Kay Dagonkopf, Untitled, strip casting.

Kevin Allodi, Ceramic Wine Cups .

ART BY
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY
SENIOR ART MAJORS
1977-1978

Maureen Hardebeck, Untitled, photograph.
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COOKIES
CANDIES

Paul Mielke, Guild Cookbook, division page
drawing.
Charles Martin, Untitled, photograph.

Karen Allison, Untitled, kodalith photograph.
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MY NAME IS IMMORTAL

the cross pulls me away from myself
into the hole
ground swells up and takes me in

and the flames of hell
lick my groin and a sweet cream
spurts forth and covers my face
I cannot help it Jesus
this is your funeral not mine
this is your grave
this is your cross
this is your fate
your fate
your fate
your box
your coffin
your tomb
your winding sheets
your gray ashen sunken face
your meaning to take with you
your dream soured on tongues of followers
your success
your failure
your posterity
0

sky blackens
birds sleep in nests
rivers stop
clouds cover over
my bones suck marrow from themselves
and I crack the chrysalis searching for the meaning
in this passion
in this movement away from life
into death
Jesus-your feet bleed
Jesus-your face swells

0

0

.

Jesus-your mind cringes against the shadow of the cross
and I buy avocados at the market for
I wash my Datsun
I hike with my dogs
I make love
I wash dishes
I cut grass
I do this
and do that
and think about tomorrow
and lessons
bills
worries
ashes
ashes
ashes
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
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and my pulse lies
my mind reels drunkenly with fear
because I see the old tire in the ditch
the water heater with weeds growing inside
the snake skin by the side of the road

and I see nothing of myself
nothing of dreams
nothing of tomorrow
no future
no dreams
no
0

0

0
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and the cross covers the ground and finds me there
the shadow of the cross finds me ... roots me to the spot
covers the hill with holes and I am in them
I am in the tomb
I am eaten alive with maggots
my dreams poems . .. loves ... lives are sullen
spoiled ... terrible to see ... to dream ... my eyes are sockets
my ears rot off my tongue tastes despair
JESUS ...
AND THE BREATHING EASES
THE AIR CLEANS BY MORNING LIGHT BREAKING ACROSS
THE VALLEYS
AND THE BIRDS SOAR HIGH IN THE BLUE SKY
THE IRIS BREAKS ALONG THE FENCES
WHILE THE NEW LAMBS
EAT NEW GRASS AND NUZZLE AND BUMP
THEIR MOTHERS FOR MILK
THE SHEPHERD WATCHING
HIS DOG AT HIS SIDE
THE CARS MOVING BEYOND ON THE FREEWAY
THE PREACHER STANDING WITH HEAD DOWN
THE SIDEWALKS CARRY PEOPLE HERE AND THERE
AND THE BLOOD races
and my eyes sing
and the feeling returns to the air and to my senses
and I dream again
I hope again
I see again
I believe again
the passion turns
the passion turns
the passion turns
I am whole again and forever
I am flowers in meadows
I am sky and snow in ravines
and in mountain passes
my oils mix with comets
my bones pound through daisies
my memories breathe in others
my name is immortal
my story is Jesus
my life goes on and on
through wine- dark seas
through terrible storms
that rattle atoms and break galaxies yet I shall live
and live and live .. .

J.

April, 1978
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MORE NOTES FROM MY zi..iRICH DIARY

EVERYONE KNOWS BY NOW
that comedy is a serious business and
that the lowest comedy, the farce and
burlesque and particularly the one
commedia dell'arte style, need the
physical movement as much as sheer
wit to survive. The farce is ever-present and everlasting. There is not one
good comedy that does not contain
elements of the farce. The farcical
may have its fun with words too-how
much of the witty farce is in an Oscar
Wilde or Tom Stoppard play!-but,
basically, the wit of the farce lies in
the physical, and the commedia dell'arte
has made full use of it.
The commedia players also knew of
the power of improvisation. Any
extemporaneous joke, if well-phrased
and hitting its target, has the better
of any well-prepared and polished
point. One of the secrets for the success
of farcical humor is the timing. Every
good comedian feels his way through
an audience reaction, and the quintessence of improvisation is not just a
sense of humor, but far more a sense
of knowing how to apply one's sense
of humor in a given moment and
situation.
One of the classical examples of
improvised humor was told by the
philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer.
An actor called U nzelmann was rebuked by his director and colleagues
for too much improvisation. One day
Unzelmann appeared in a play that
demanded his presence on stage with
a horse. During the performance the
horse dropped something natural to
the horse but unbecoming and unusual in the midst of a scene. The audience roared with laughter. Unzelmann turned to the horse and said:
"Don't you know we are forbidden to
improvise?"
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All this came to mind when I saw a
play by one of the last great playwrights in love with the style of the
commedia players, Count Carlo Gozzi.
He told the unforgettable stories of
The Love For Three Orange, Re Turandot, The King Stag, and many others.
One of his lesser known plays was the
one of a monster which was named
The Pink Monster by the Zi.iricher
Theater am Neumarkt. Gozzi liked
to tell fairy tales, to create a theater of
the fabulous, full of exotic fantasy, of
spontaneous language and action. It
was all there in this beauty-and-thebeast tale in which the love of a young
girl was tested.
The play was freely adapted, and
Gozzi lends himself easily to free
adaptations. It was staged by Dieter
Reible with all the extemporizing
freedom which the style of the commedia permits. The staging was full
of ideas, the most intricate puppets
were used, impressive masks and
monsters were built, soldiers made
of cardboard marched up and down;
a handful of actors played innumerable parts and changed costume and
mask in front of the audience. In short,
the most complex apparatus was set
in motion and should have shown
how easy and joyful all this makebelieve is. But-and there's the rub!we saw only how difficult this entire
masquer~de was, how much sweat and
anxiety were on the faces of these
actor-jugglers. The fun was much too
labored. It should have looked as if
improvised, but instead, it moved in
a heavy-handed manner. It's a pity
that it wasn't as funny and pretty and
innocent as it pretended to be.

*

THE SAME THEATER HAD
also presented one of the most superrealistic plays by the South African
writer Athol Frugard, who depicted
the story of two helpless creatures,
Bushman and Lena, without any rights
and protection, shadows of human
beings whose life is a constant flight
from the reality of the white man 's
world. They are colored people,
which means they are partly descended from white men without belonging to them. In fact, they belong
nowhere, and nowhere is their home.
But they despise the blacks as much
as they are despised by the white
man.
Frugard shows in a little vignette
what this life of suffering means; he
shows it in the cold light of his inner
fury that makes the spectator shiver.
Such a playlet can only succeed when
the actors are dedicated to the point
of self-abandonment, and the three
actors involved in this cruel reflection
of the South African reality made it
come off. When Peter Brook created
his soul-shaking tableaux of Marat/
Sade several years ago, I became
aware of how an actor can lose his
identity to the character he portrays.
A very similar metamorphosis took
place here.

*

"WE ARE LONGING TO GO
home and do not know where to,"
wrote the German Romantic lyricist
Joseph Eichendorff in the 1820s. He
could not have described better man
in the 1970s. Perhaps we should
envision Romanticism as a neverdying power without which man
cannot exist. Has any generation ever
stopped defying reality or trying to
escape it in some devious ways and
disguises, often in fear of his own
daring? In his self-contradictory
manner man has always longed for
his Arcadia, but it was not before the
mid-eighteenth-century that his point
of departure became a philosophical
postulate and his journey to the
destination of the unattainable turned
into a worldwide malaise. We honor
the memory of the romantic who
dared to put the naked feelings of his
tragic ecstasy on the map of history
The Cresset
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by spelling his era with a capital
"R."
Is romanticism-upper or lower
case-outdated in our scientific and
technological era? By far not. Now
that we are able to turn the moon
into a tourist attraction tomorrow,
we shall need dreams for something
even more remote and magic. We
are frightened by our own fear of
the future because there may be none.
All the more do we need to run away
from a reality which holds up a mirror
to all possible marvels while preparing the seed of destruction .
When we escape to the theater, a
spontaneous sputum of creative negligence will not do. As the true neo-

romantics that we are, we want to be
shown the excitement in mere existence and the beauty in being. We
cannot help being shocked into shame
of being human and responsible for
the sores of our portentous and potent
era ever so often. But the newest
paroxysms of negation, improvisensational obscurity, the depths of
hollowness should have run their
course by now. So much is taken for
art which is little more than a feeble
and defiant scribble on the wall.
Shall we take it for the Mene Tekel of
our time or already as its epitaph?
If escape we must, we want to be
told at least one truth of the many
truths; we want to face the revelation

of life's mystery or some aspect of it;
yes, even a romantic and escapist
needs to be shown the image of a
heightened, danced reality, an image
formed out of an inner cry and
outer chaos.
Bertolt Brecht once said, "What
kind of a time is this in which it is a
crime to speak of trees!" In true neoromantic fashion we must add: Because it is the time it is, an extremely
sordid state of affairs, let us also
speak of trees. After all, the tree is
but a symbol of our belief in the
creative will, a symbol of our hope
that something will and can last if
not hit by lightning, lightning from
I
above or man-made lightning.

OLD AGE

The red disk
visible
through the stark trees
of autumn
above the silent lake,
reflects.
The still wind
rests
from its labors
bent ahead.
Languid eyes
see gnarled fingers
ponder
the red ball
hold it up,
wonder.
It it time
to set
it
down?

I

•

CRAIG LEE ASHBAUGH
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THE ANNOTATED JULFS VERNE:
TWENTY THOUSAND LEAGUFS
UNDER THE SEA.
Annotated and restored by Walter James
Miller. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell

Company, 1976. Pp. 362.

MY EXPERIENCE is that people
think Jules Verne represents genius
of the highest order, or they wonder what the big to-do is all about.
For either of you, Walter James
Miller has done a favor.
In the first place, Miller restores
the text, horribly mangled by the
translator in the "standard" English
edition, and annotates a variety of
items to titillate the tastes of those
who eat Verne up. In the second, he
demonstrates that Verne is by no
means the haphazard and sloppy
writer the wonderers have thought
April, 1978

he was. In French, he is considerably
better.
You see, the translator, working
under the name of "Mercier Lewis,"
had some bees in his bonnet. He was
a clergyman with axes to grind. Verne
loved science and tried to slip in a
bit of painless teaching in all his
novels. "Mercier Lewis" didn't
approve the science, so he didn't
translate it. Verne liked to make
political comments. "Mercier Lewis"
had different politics. So he failed to
translate or mis-translated the author's
political allusions. Verne used the
metric system. "Mercier Lewis" apparently didn't even understand the
metric system, because in translating
everything tb feet and inches, he
missed the point much of the time.
Worst of all, Verne made idiomatic
jokes in French, by which he built
his characterizations. "Mercier Lewis"
missed the jokes- and in his translation, you do too.
In fact, after Walter James Miller
gets through with "Mercier Lewis,"
one wonders whatever possessed
"Lewis" to translate Verne at all. It is
amazing that Verne has as large an
English following as he has, with
such "friends" to tout his work.
And so we all owe Miller a debt.
On the other hand, Miller isn't
such a hotshot annotator. In the first
place, he retains the "Mercier Lewis"
text throughout, except where "Lewis"
omits passages altogether. Those
Miller fills in for you. All the other
corrections he puts into the notes.
Personally, I would have preferred
a fresh translation. The notes could
have been used to show where "Lewis"
made hash of the original; but we
could have had the benefits of a
smooth and accurate translation to
follow and avoided having to check
the notes to see how it ought to have
read . One of the jokes in particular
might have come off better had Miller
chosen to do a complete translation.
Conseil has a habit of speaking to
Aronnax only in the third person
("If Monsieur would care to, he might
. . . "). Late in the book, Conseil
lets slip a "you" under circumstances
in which this is both funny and
revealing of Conseil's character.

"Mercier Lewis," predictably missing
the point, changes them all to second
person ("If you, sir, would care to,
you might . . . "). Miller's decision
to leave us with the "Lewis" version
to follow for the main story lines
puts the joke in the notes instead of
in the text.
Miller accuses "Lewis" of being
arbitrary; but Miller's own annotations appear pretty arbitrary themselves. Frequently, Verne will give a
list of sea-creatures, together with
some scientific terminology in his
campaign to educate his readers. It
seems to me that a proper annotator
would have annotated them. But
Miller picks out two or three in a
list, and leaves as many as ten others,
equally intriguing, completely
uncommented upon. Why those and
not the rest? Again, there are references to historical personages with
whom I, at least, am unfamiliar.
Some of these Miller introduces to
us. Others (who is the "Knight of
Rhodes, Dieudonne de Gozon," for
example?) we are simply left to
wonder about.
Worse than this, however, is the
fact that some of Miller's notes are
simply inaccurate. He declares that
the Celsius temperature scale is very
logical (true), while Fahrenheit is
entirely arbitrary (false). To be sure,
Celsius is simpler to work with; but
Dr. Fahrenheit was by no means
being arbitrary when he invented
his scale. He did not pick thirty-two
degrees for freezing and 212° for
boiling water out of the blue. Rather,
he wanted to choose things he thought
anyone could duplicate. Zero degrees
was then the coldest temperature
attainable. It was achieved by the
progressive freezing of salt water,
something anyone could replicate
nearly any time he needed to. You
still use the principle when you make
homemade ice cream. One hundred
degrees he set equal to the temperature of the human body-something
else he imagined people carried with
them. Evidently, the good doctor had
a fever at the time. These might not
be useful designations any longer;
but they are not arbitrary. Miller
has just not done all his homework.
25

One of the puzzles of the book,
commencing from shortly after the
time Aronnax, Conseil, and Ned Land
are picked up by the Nautilus, is the
language spoken by the crew. It is
mysterious both to Aronnax and to
the reader, and Verne does not answer
the question directly anywhere. Miller
gives us his own speculation- but
neither at the beginning of the book
where it first arises, nor at the end,
so as not to detract from Verne's
purpose for keeping it secret. We
get it on page 327, and without ever
a mention that perhaps Verne wanted
it to be a secret. The only hint Verne
himself ever gives concerning the
crew's language is not given to us
unless we read Mysten'ous Island, where
Verne reveals the answer to another
closely guarded secret- that of
Nemo's true nationality. Presumably
the shipboard language could be
Nemo's. Miller doesn't even consider
it.
Probably Miller's worst critical
offense of all is to confuse the opinions
of a character with that of the author.
Example: Miller maintains that in
spite of Verne's idealism, he remains
prejudiced. Reason : Conseil and
Aronnax think of the Papuan "savages" as being near apes. This is high
school level criticism. Many authors
create characters with opinions different from their own . In this case,
not only are Conseil's and Aronnax's
opinions a part of Verne's careful
characterization, but the true "hero"
of the book is not Aronnax, but Nemo
himself-who disagrees with Aronnax
on this and several other politically
charged issues.
So. Walter James Miller is not such
a great critic. There are plenty of
flaws in the work . I wish the book
had been done better, because I think
Verne deserves a little better. But
Miller has done us a favor by bringing
out The Annotated Jules Verne. Go
buy it for your son or daughter for
Christmas. And read it yourself before
you wrap it up.
Or maybe a giant squid will get
you.

WALTER R. RIEDEL
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TOM BROWN'S UNIVERSE
By J. R. DeS. Honey. Quadrangle:
The New York Times Book Co., 1977,
Pp. xi + 416. $12.50.

BROWN'S
UNIVERSE
TOM
explores the world of the English prep
school, an institution whose graduates,
though not curriculum, have wielded
enormous influence on the world. This
will prove an admirable book or just
an involved history of British education, depending on one's point of view;
it is certain, however, that those who
read it will find it informative and
even downright shocking. The problem of student unrest, we find by
reading this book, was nothing new
in the 1950s with the famous blackboard jungles or in the 1960s with the
campus riots, for the archetypal patterns of these recent phenomena can
be seen much earlier in the English
great schools of the last century. The
precise recording of these phenomena
and the keen analysis of them constitute extremely strong points in the
book. Thus when an American educator or parent reads that it took
George the Third himself to stop a
riot of boys at Eton, then at the very
least the real dimensions of modern
education come into clearer perspective. Another special feature of this
book is that it goes further and tends
to clarify the roles of both educators
and parents in a highly developed
society. Finally, this is a political book
in the sense that it is a book about the
politics of running a school. We see
the emergence of many strong personalities, and sometimes they are in sharp
conflict about what is the best education for the children of England, and
it is in these conflicts that we see much
that is food for thought. There is an
abundance of notes and an excellent
bibliography for those who wish to
read further on the subject, although
at certain times one feels the notes
are too extensive. But this is one of
the very few weaknesses in an
absorbing book, a book which will
surely enjoy a very wide readership
among parents, educators, historians,
literary buffs, and thinking laymen.

JOHN K. COWGER

SCIENCE, ETHICS AND MEDICINE.
The Foundations of Ethics and Its
Relationship to Science. Volume I.
H. Tristram Englhardt, Jr. and Daniel
Callahan, Editors. The Hastings Center,
Hastings-on-Hudson, N .Y.: Institute of
Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences,
1976.
KNOWLEDGE, VALUEAND BELIEF.
The Foundations of Ethics and Its
Relationship to Science. Volume II.
H . Tristram Englhardt, Jr. and Daniel
Callahan, Editors. The Hastings Center,
Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Institute of
Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences,
1977.

HARDLY ANYONE IS unaware
of the extensive burgeoning of literature in the field of bioethics during
the past decade. For seven of those
years the Institute of Society, Ethics,
and the Life Sciences, the Hastings
Center, has contributed its fair share
to that literature. One of several
major institutes dedicated to the
study of moral, legal, and social
problems of biomedicine, the Institute has taken an interdisciplinary
approach which has brought together
in its work and publications, scholars
and professionals from the fields of
philosophy, medicine, biology, social science, law, history, and theology. As one might expect, a wide
diversity of opinion has been evident. That same diversity of opinion
continues to find expression in these
two volumes.
However, these two volumes and
the two more that are anticipated
represent a new departure in the
history of the Institute. The result of
a research project funded by the
National Endowment for the Humanities, Volumes I and II have initiated
a series of papers and responses that
enter the thorny thicket of the foundations of ethics and the relationship
of ethics to science. The effort is to
go beneath the descriptive evaluative
discussion, which analyzes, identifies,
and offers opinions on issues in
bioethics, to the more fundamental,
prior questions: Is there an inherent
ethical dimension to science in general and biomedicince in particular?
Are ethics and science compatible as
disciplines? Is there a cogent, shareThe Cresset

able foundation of moral judgments
to which we can appeal for a truly
productive public discussion of problems in bioethics?
The first two of these questions
dominate the contributions in Volume
I. The discussion withal is on the
interdependent relationship of fact
and value. Michael Scriven attempts
to lock the two together in the opening
chapter by arguing the general claim
that ethics is a science, indeed, "the
empress of science-no more, no less."
Appealing to logic and a variety of
evidences from the social sciences,
Scriven attempts to justify his claim
and its conclusion that the outcomes
of ethics can be rationally appraised
and accepted just as the outcomes of
other sciences. Scriven proposes that
if this claim for the scientific status
of ethics can be sustained, then its
corollary is also true, science is not
value-free.
From a considerably different
perspective John Ladd argues in a
subsequent chapter that science
should be considered as morally
neutral. Ladd's concern is to scrutinize
and criticize the false pretensions of
the "Ideology of Science" which
considers the pursuit of science to be
a highly moral activity constituting
virtually a moral imperative. Ladd
fears that the popular acceptance of
this claim will enable science to
achieve unwarranted immunity to
genuine public moral accountability.
Similarly, Marc Lappee argues in a
later chapter that scientists have an
obligation to weigh the moral consequences of pursuing their new
hypotheses.
OTHER ASPECTS OF THE RElationship of science and ethics are
also explored. H. Tristram Englhardt,
Jr. offers a most interesting article
on the value judgments implicit in
medical science's definitions of what
constitutes disease and health. Eric
Cassell develops a helpful discourse
on how the patient's disclosures about
himself contribute to the shaping of
applied moral thought in clinical
practice. The value of ethical thought
to the practical operation of medicine
is further pursued by Samuel Gorovitz
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and Alasdair Macintyre in their
attempt to bring philosophical inquiry
to bear upon a theory of medical
fallibility that can shed light on
current malpractice concerns. This
is but a sampling.
By the editors' account, the essays
and responses in the first volume
taken together permit five general
conclusions which indicate a clear
overlap of subject matter and key
concepts in the relationship between
ethics and the sciences. Thus, "a clear
line cannot be drawn between evaluation and explanation."
VOLUME II CONTINUES THE
interdisciplinary discussion of the
relationship of ethics to science.
However, the essential focus here is
the question of a foundation for
evaluative judgments that can be
shared by science and ethics. It is in
this context that theology's dependence on an appeal to God for the
grounding of its ethics comes under
scrutiny. Perhaps one of the most
telling exchanges in the entire volume is that between Alasdair
Macintyre, a philosopher, and Paul
Ramsey, a the o I o g ian-ethicist.
Mac Intyre argues against the validity of what he considers to be Kant's
thesis that morality presupposes
theology. While it is true, as Kant
states, that belief in moral obligation
presupposes teleology does not necessarily entail belief in God. By this
argument Macintyre drives a wedge
between theology and the intellectual world which we all, including
science and contemporary theology,
inhabit. The two are incompatible
because belief in the existence of
God is implausible. However, this
does not mean the end of belief in
moral obligation, according to
Macintyre. Rather, we can rationally locate our appeal to moral action
in a commitment to history as moral
progression.
In opposition to this disparaging
view of religiously-based ethics,
Ramsey points out, first of all, that
we should not talk about the place
of religion in ethics or medical ethics
as though its capacity to shore up
ethics could provide a justification

for its existence. The reverse is the
case. Religion is the vocation of
humankind. Ethics is an outgrowth
of it and plays a subordinate role.
Ethics is, therefore, ultimately dependent upon God for its grounding.
Moreover, faith's perception of the
divine performance is, historically,
a firmer foundation than commitment to an as-yet-unfinished history
of moral progression.
There are somewhat mediating
responses offered by others in two
subsequent essays. However, the
exchange between Ramsey and MacIntyre is something like a "contemporary-classic" confrontation between
the claims of theology and the skepticism of scientific reason.
BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF
the Macintyre-Ramsey debate, David
Burrell and Stanley Hauerwas propse
that we understand the foundation
of ethics as provided by a "story"
that is lived as an understanding of
reality. It is the substantive story that
generates and sustains the moral life.
Indeed, the test of a story's worth
and validity is the sort of person it
shapes. Religious faith is, then, the
phenomemon of accepting certain
stories as canonical. The validity and
worth of religion as regards life and
ethics is therefore determined by its
ability to pass the test. This view is
offered as a rational alternative to
what the authors consider the "standard account" of systematic ethics and
its frustrated efforts to scientifically
demonstrate the objectivity of moral
judgments. This is both fascinating
and helpful but not totally adequate,
because the application of the test of
stories ultimately involves itself in
some motion of objectivity.
Again, this is only a taste of what
the volume contains. The reader will
find the format of essays followed by
responses in both volumes interesting
and helpful. By this means of addressing the questions at hand, the
two volumes, taken together, convey
very clearly the enormous complexity
of these problems and their resistance
to easy solutions.
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